Seven Days Before Richmond

On the Federal side of the lines, Porter was feeling good about the performance of his V Corps. They had held the line of Beaver Dam Creek through a five hour battle and had inflicted many more casualties than they had suffered. McCall’s division had borne the brunt of the Confederate attack, and had used the advantage of their high ground along the east bank of the creek. The brigade commanders had acquitted themselves well, especially Reynolds and Truman Seymour, and the artillery had been effective.22 Porter had little to complain about and much to be proud of. McClellan had been with Porter for the entire battle, and, as the firing dwindled, McClellan telegraphed Marcy that they had held their ground, and praised Morell and McCall for their splendid performance. He then messaged Stanton that the battle was at a virtual end for the day and that he had moved V Corps’s “impediments” across the Chickahominy and hoped to be ready for the coming day. He also claimed to have been victorious against great odds, which was patently incorrect, but McClellan always seemed to think he faced such odds. The Federals had not exactly been victorious, but had fought well and held their position.23 The immediate effect of the battle was to boost Federal troop morale. Oddly, most Richmonders had a lack of current information on the outcome of the day’s fighting, and many thought that Jackson had arrived and had defeated McClellan. Even some New York City newspapers reported that McClellan had been defeated. In Washington, more reinforcements for McClellan were being readied.24 McClellan remained at Porter’s V Corps headquarters until the wee hours of the 27th. Among the reports reaching McClellan were those verifying the arrival of Jackson’s troops on the field. It was obvious to McClellan that Porter’s Corps could not remain where it was without being isolated and destroyed. The next likely event would be the loss of communication with the Army’s logistical base at White House Landing. Porter made two suggestions to McClellan. He wanted McClellan to bring the whole army north of the Chickahominy and fight it out with Lee. This was not a viable option for logistical reasons. Porter’s other suggestion was to bring across enough reinforcements for him to hold Lee at bay, while Federal forces south of the river attacked westward toward Richmond. Perhaps Porter had come to grasp Lee’s desperate strategy. Curiously, McClellan chose not to implement Porter’s latter suggestion. Smith and Franklin made an even more innovative suggestion. They urged the withdrawal of Porter’s corps to the south of the river, destroying the bridges behind them and isolating Lee’s four divisions on the north bank, while the Army of the Potomac attacked Richmond. The down side of this strategy was to force the abandonment of the White House base. McClellan took neither of these suggestions. He believed that there was a huge Confederate force facing him, capable of attacking his lines of communication, while simultaneously defending Richmond from attack south of the Chickahominy. McClellan essentially ruled out any offensive strategy at this point. The defensive choices left open to the Army of the Potomac were either to retreat down the peninsula or to change base to the James. He chose the latter option. McClellan did not immediately decide exactly what he wanted V Corps to do next. Porter would have to be reinforced, if V Corps was to remain north of the river. McClellan elected to return to his own headquarters and make the decision.25 The early morning of June 26 was a critical time for George McClellan. Had he made a firm decision to attack in force toward Old Tavern as planned, he likely would have been victorious. An attack anywhere on the south side of the Chickahominy would have been successful in cracking the relatively thin Confederate lines. Lee would have been forced to redeploy his forces to protect Richmond, and McClellan could have completed his change of base during that time. Now, some twenty-four hours later, his decision was even more difficult. Whether an attack south of the river would have penetrated the Richmond defenses is not an appropriate criterion for deciding on an attack in force. Even without penetration of Richmond, at the end of the day, the Army of the Potomac would have been closer to their objective, would have attained a better appreciation of the true strength of their Confederate adversaries, and could have then laid siege to the city. The siege of 1864–1865 would have taken place two years sooner. McClellan, however, was overwhelmed by his cautious side, and failed to act. This failure assured the bloody, inconclusive battles to follow, the eventual demise of his own military career, and a significant prolongation of the war. George B. McClellan could no longer win, because he was too afraid to lose